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CHAPTER 3
From the Unlearned Un-man to 
a Pedagogy without Moulding: 
Stirner, Consciousness-Raising, 
and the Production of Difference
Rhiannon Firth and Andrew Robinson
Using the theories of Max Stirner and the jointly authored works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, this chapter seeks to critique pedagogies of 
moulding and to map and theorize alternatives. We begin by summarizing 
“moulding,”—why it is incompatible with post-representational politics, and 
the ways in which it persists in contemporary pedagogical theory. We then 
explore Stirner’s anarchism, demonstrating the complicity of moulding peda-
gogies with political representation. We draw on further sources of inspiration 
including Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) three stages of schizoanalysis as well 
as practices of feminist consciousness-raising in the 1970s. Using these diverse 
sources, we seek to provide a working model of pedagogy without moulding, 
which can give rise to autonomous, self-valorizing subjects of becoming.
Post-representational politics and autonomous social movements are 
growing fields of study in radical political theory. Growing trends within 
poststructuralism, anarchism, and liberation theories reject essentialist 
accounts of true and false representations, and the Cartesian “knowing 
subject.” Instead, the ontology of existence is taken to be a non-hierarchical, 
chaotic field of becoming. This ontology gives rise to ethical positions, which 
valorize this process of becoming and the resultant difference and unique-
ness. So far, the pedagogical implications of postrepresentational politics 
are underexplored and inadequately theorized. Even radical approaches 
frequently embrace institutional schooling as a means of producing compe-
tencies and literacies deemed desirable by the knowing subject. One reason 
for this is the prevalence of what we call pedagogies of moulding, which we 
argue are incompatible with political radicalism, and prevalent in existing 
(even critical) forms of pedagogy.
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Education as Moulding
Mainstream education assumes a process in which an empowered “knowing 
subject” (a teacher, institution, parent, etc.) imparts skills, beliefs or person-
ality attributes to a learner. This process transforms the learner in a direction 
desired by the knowing subject. The goal is usually either social or moral: 
conceived as necessary to meet social goals, to produce a particular kind 
of ethical subject, or to help the learner “succeed” relative to social criteria. 
Moulding is sometimes portrayed as socialization—the adaptation of indi-
viduals to an existing social system. To various degrees, a vertical command 
relationship is built into the pedagogical situation, generated by the assump-
tion that the ascribed ideal goal is more valuable than the actual existing 
subject. As Stirner (1845) puts it, “A person of good breeding is one into whom 
‘good maxims’ have been instilled and impressed, poured in through a funnel, 
thrashed in and preached in” (p. 70). For historical reasons, this is unsurpris-
ing. The institution of the school has its origins in nationalist projects, which 
explicitly aimed for moulding. As Spring (2004) argues, “traditional forms 
of nationalist education attempt to mold loyal and patriotic citizens” (p. ix). 
Modern schooling emerged as a fundamental part of this process, connected 
to the eras of integrated national economies and inclusive Fordist/corporatist 
social infrastructures in order to “Separat[e] children from the community 
and plac[e] them in a controlled environment [that] provides the opportunity 
to mold entire generations to serve political and economic interests” (p. 2).
The emergence of neoliberalism at a global level has not undermined 
the form of moulding institutions, which have been retooled for capitalist 
goals and connected to new modes of social control. For instance, neoliberal 
approaches emphasize “key competencies,” which are “needed by every-
one across a variety of different life contexts” and must be moulded into 
everyone through schooling (Brewerton, 2004, p. 3; c.f. Barth, Godemann, 
Rieckmann & Stoltenberg, 2007). It is common for universities to adver-
tise “graduate attributes”—the characteristics into which students will be 
moulded, providing a reliable “product” for employers. Hence, neoliberal 
models offer a general code of moulding, providing theories of pedagogical 
best practice which ignore the institutional context of learning and leave 
disciplinary institutions in place, “sweeping under the carpet the limitations 
of obligatory mass schooling” (Simola, 1998, p. 339).
Critical theorists generally reject the cruder forms of moulding that 
assume students are passive and docile, for instance, consider Freire’s cri-
tique of “banking education” (Freire, 1972, p. 58). However, it is our con-
tention that few writers on critical and alternative pedagogies reject the mould-
ing approach entirely. Instead, they either reject the dominant methods of 
moulding or the desirable model into which students are to be moulded. In 
short, most critical approaches assume the framework of modern schooling—
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mass-scale compulsory institutions in which children are segregated, so as 
to be exposed to content or activities selected by others, and higher education 
institutions building on schooling in similarly segregated spaces—but seek 
to modify either the content of these institutions (e.g., more social critique, 
media awareness, ecology, ethics, challenging privilege) or the methods used 
once students are in place (e.g., holistic, dialogical, participatory, or student-
centered methods).
Let us examine a few examples. Jonathan Arendt (2008), using Frankfurt 
School critical theory, argues that the education system is an effective place 
to instill “deconstructive and analytical abilities” to offset media influence 
(p. 41). Similarly, Kellner (2008) wants schooling, which “develops skills 
that will help create good citizens and that will make them more motivated 
and competent participants in social life” (p. 55). Ecological educator Martin 
(1996), writing for the World Wildlife Fund, argues that “the education 
system must . . . prepare all people for their role as well-informed, skilled 
and experienced participators in determining the quality and structure of 
the world” (p. 51). Feminist ethicist Nel Noddings (2010), a fierce opponent 
of character education, nevertheless observes that, “a major responsibility 
of parents has long been to shape children so that they will be acceptable to 
the community in which they will live” (p. 390). This is not something she 
wants to change, but to simply inflect with care ethics instead of traditional 
moralism. For Henry Giroux (2008), a central figure in contemporary critical 
pedagogy, “in order for freedom to flourish in the worldly space of the public 
realm, citizens have to be formed, educated, and socialized” (p. 207).
Major traditions of critical pedagogy do not escape this critique. The 
Deweyan tradition does not reject moulding. For instance, Rorty (1991) 
observes that “it never occurred to Dewey that there was something inher-
ently ‘repressive’ about society. . . . He took over . . . the idea that you have 
to be socialized to be human” (p. 213). Freirean pedagogy is often framed as 
an alternative to moulding approaches and indeed provides many useful 
resources. Nevertheless, Marxist scholars have convincingly argued that 
Freire’s model retains aspects of a directed process of development in which 
the teacher directs a process of development towards a particular teleologi-
cal horizon (Au, 2007). Poststructuralists, similarly, tend to pursue trans-
gressions within dominant institutions, rather than against them. Despite 
the anti-authoritarian tendencies of Foucault, Deleuze, and others, many 
who draw on their theories in the field of education fail to draw distinc-
tions between moulding and other approaches. For instance, Stephen J. Ball’s 
policy-relevant Foucauldianism focuses on different regimes within the edu-
cation system, without any apparent objection to the disciplinary effects of 
schooling itself (see Ball, 2012). Other, particularly Deleuzian, approaches 
often talk about general conditions of learning in ways which apply as much 
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to schools and other spaces (e.g., St. Pierre, 2004; Zembylas, 2002), which 
emphasize education as affective and bodily self-transformation, with little 
emphasis on power. Their key task is to show that education (in schools 
or out) is partly networked, affective, embodied and so on, rather than to 
challenge the repressive affective regime of moulding. This often leads to a 
kind of flattening of thought onto reality, when, in the absence of structural 
contestation, micro-level resistances (which keep authoritarianism in place) 
constitute the whole of opposition. For example, in an explicitly political 
story aimed at education students, critical race scholars Green and Dantley 
(2013) explore a fictional case of a white principal sent into a mainly black 
inner-city school. After exposing epistemological privilege and structural 
racism, the modeled solution is simply to facilitate black leadership and 
better results within this skewed system.
The lack of critical attention to the question of moulding is in some 
respects, surprising. There is a growing trend towards the critique of current 
patterns of epistemic privilege and power. For instance, decolonial schol-
ars have called for the rejection of colonial epistemological politics and the 
resultant ideas of a unified thinking subject, the privileging of mind over 
body, and the disciplining of subjectivity (Motta & Cole, 2014, p. 14). However, 
the extent to which this requires revolutionizing or overcoming formal edu-
cational institutions—rather than simply changing their methods, contents 
or curricula—has been neglected. In many respects, a critique of moulding is 
coextensive with a critique of modern epistemic power. Moulding is funda-
mentally connected to sovereignty in Agamben’s sense, the split between val-
ueless bare life and politically valued life (Agamben, 1998). If people lack the 
“key competencies” or “personality traits” (Barth et al., 2007, p. 420) to “live 
and work successfully in our globalised world” (Clifford & Montgomery, 2011, 
p. 13), or the “competencies to participate in a democratic culture” (Kellner, 
2008:63), or any of the other formulations of political ideas, they are excluded 
from participation in society. The structure here is fundamentally a struc-
ture of abyssal thinking (Santos, 2007), in which certain ways of being are 
devalued and suppressed—the same style of thinking which is typically 
criticized in decolonial accounts (Mignolo, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatshemi, 2012). 
The unlearned and unschooled (or unsuccessfully schooled, or unschool-
able) person, including most of the global poor (c.f. Reimer, 1971, pp. 15, 39, 
74), is defined, as Stirner would put it, as an un-man—a valueless being to 
be excluded from the order of recognition, and therefore, quite possibly, 
from a “life worth living.” This abyssal effect—and the epistemic hierarchy 
and epistemicide it necessarily implies—is the ineliminable remainder of 
pedagogies of moulding.
We contend that the rejection of moulding is a necessary part of a com-
prehensive project of dis-alienation. Critical pedagogues, Marxists, ecologi-
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cal educators, poststructuralists, and human rights educators are in their 
own ways, seeking dis-alienation. The difficulty is that they usually seek it by 
alienated means, using structures designed for moulding an alienated subject 
so as to instead mould a dis-alienated subject. This performative contradic-
tion draws them back into reproducing modernist pedagogical power. In the 
next section, we explore Stirner’s critique of moulding as necessarily alienat-
ing, before outlining a potentially dis-alienating pedagogical approach.
Stirner, Spooks, and Moulding
Stirner, who worked as a teacher for much of his life, was intimately con-
cerned with questions of education from a post-Hegelian point of view. He 
was working in an educational context, dominated by the Humboldtian 
model of self-development through schooling, which was elaborated from 
theories such as Schiller’s (2006 [1794]), in which education is seen as a 
means to self-actualization. Stirner rejected the prior Hegelian theories of 
self-actualization on epistemological grounds, because of their reliance on 
belief that one’s ideas are objective and substantive aside from the knowing 
self (Stepelevitch, 1985, p. 613). Instead, Stirner argues that self-actualization 
emerges from an ‘egoist’ perspective unique to each of us. Like Hegel and 
Marx, Stirner is concerned with the question of dis-alienation: the achieve-
ment of “man’s proper home, in which nothing alien regulates and rules 
him any longer” (1845, p. 60). Also, in common with his Hegelian heritage, 
Stirner formulates a series of stages through which societies or individuals 
are believed to pass, in order to arrive at the desired end-state, effectively, a 
theory of maturation into autonomous subjectivity. This model continues 
from Stirner’s earliest, untranslated works in which he treated education 
as a process of self-development and humanization (de Ridder, 2008, p. 289).
First Stage: Hedonism
In Stirner’s (1845) model, children exercise will from their earliest days; they 
“have no sacred interest and know nothing of a ‘good cause’. They know all the 
more accurately what they have a fancy for” (p. 265). However, their hedon-
istic orientation to material objects of desire renders them vulnerable to 
control strategies based on rewards and punishments (p. 18). Hence, Stirner 
considers behaviorist strategies of reward and punishment—so central in 
“control society” in relation to adults as well as children—to be marks of the 
lowest, least mature phase of will.
Second Stage: Spook-Ridden
At a certain point, “the rod is too weak against our obduracy, and ‘courage’ 
replaces fear” (Stirner, 1845, p. 18). This leads to the second stage, where geist 
(mind/spirit) allows us to defy physical domination and incentive structures. 
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While this is progressive in relation to hedonism, it also leads to our being 
controlled or mastered by particular ideas (p. 55). People have in themselves 
a “wheel in the head,” a reactive affect, such as fear of a spook, which gives 
fixed ideas and external hierarchies power over them (p. 163). These wheels 
function like clockwork, making people follow the “spook’s” will (p. 75). This 
causes an inner split, as the real self has to be exiled, a “banishment” or 
“ostracism” of the ego or will (p. 177). Contemporary social forms and mould-
ing pedagogies arise at this level: since the state activates the clockwork of 
wheels in the head, it destroys the egos it subsumes, alienating them to itself: 
“for as long as the State is the ego, the individual ego must remain a poor devil, 
a non-ego” (p. 194); it “does not let me come to my value” and requires “my 
valuelessness” to exist (p. 195).
As an approach to pedagogy, this reproduces alienation from oneself. 
Spooks always lead to an exclusion, which produces a sovereign split. For 
instance, “man” leads to the “un-man,” a man who does not correspond to 
the concept and therefore is jailed, labeled insane, and so on. Such a split is 
possible only if “the concept of man can be separated from the existence, the 
essence from the appearance” (p. 139), i.e., by means of alienation.
Third Stage: Egoism
At the third stage, one discovers oneself as a “corporeal self,” a “living flesh-
and-blood person,” escaping possession by objects and spooks (Stirner, 1845, 
p. 21). The second-stage realization that I “need not be the slave of my appe-
tites” is retained in the third stage, “but I want still more” (p. 254). The third-
stage egoist is to be immune not only to coercion and bribery, but also to 
control by spooks and wheels in the head.
The egoist self is self-valorizing: “I give my own self value” (p. 196), by 
a standard which is not that of a spook. A self-valorizing will seizes, rather 
than demands, rights (p. 50–51), and uses thoughts and things in bricolage 
(p. 255–256, 260). Language is to be subordinated to the flow of becoming, 
with Stirner even advocating a state of “thoughtlessness” so as to be free 
from dominance by ideas (p. 263). In many respects, Stirner’s is a standpoint 
theory, arguing for a viewpoint on any matter “starting from me,” precluding 
moral and legal criteria of judgment (p. 185). Every unique self has its own 
partial philosophical view, and there are no universal theories that apply 
to all selves. Each person is a “repository of unique experiences and ideas,” 
which should not be reduced to any representation (Koch, 1997, p. 97). The 
egoist self is driven by an expressive pursuit of intensity and uniqueness, the 
imperative to live life to the fullest (Stirner, 1845, p. 231) in order to achieve dis-
alienation. In effect, this is a theory of self-actualization: “‘egoism’ calls you 
to joy over yourselves, to self-enjoyment” (p. 130). Alienation is overcome in 
a rejection of the “foolish mania to be something else than you are” (p. 131).
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Stirnerian selves are constantly changing and learning: “If you are 
bound to your past hour, if you must babble today because you babbled yes-
terday, if you cannot transform yourself each instant, you feel yourself fet-
tered in slavery and benumbed” (Stirner, 1845, p. 39). However, this process 
of self-transformation is a process of becoming and differenciation (difference 
production), not a process of moulding. Life is not a means to an external 
calling or destiny; rather, one is to “make any use he likes of his life” (p. 245). 
Instead of an external calling, one has an imminent becoming: “forces that 
manifest themselves where they are because their being consists solely in 
their manifestation” (p. 249). Moulding is condemned as interference with 
becoming. “No sheep, no dog, exerts itself to become a ‘proper sheep, a proper 
dog’. . . . It realizes itself in living itself out, in dissolving itself, passing away” 
(p. 252). A trained dog “is no better for itself than a natural one,” though 
perhaps more useful for humans (1845, p. 253). As de Acosta (2007) puts it, 
Stirner sees the state as an “insult,” which makes him “less than what he 
imagines he could be” (p. 36).
Stirner’s idea of the “ego” needs to be clarified. “Ego” in the Cartesian, 
psychoanalytic, and decolonial senses is closer to what Stirner refers to as 
geist (mind or spirit). In fact, a Stirnerian ego seems to be closer to a Jungian 
or existentialist “authentic self ” than to the socially optimizing personas 
or rational instrumentalists most often designated by the term. The egoist 
self is expressive and passionate—not a being of rational interests. It is ulti-
mately something, which cannot be thought or conceptualized, since any 
fixed definition turns it into a representation or spook. As Stirner writes 
in his reply to critics: “What Stirner says is a word, a thought, a concept; 
what he means is no word, no thought, no concept. What he says is not 
what is meant and what he means is unsayable” (Stirner, 1977, p. 67). Egoists 
resist the use of normativity and social mediation in defining their rela-
tions. Instead, a kind of direct connection (“intercourse”) or enmity arises. 
In essence, the relation to another is not mediated by a “third party,” or a 
normative regime of rightness (1845, p. 162). Others are to be recognized 
as “unique beings who bear their law in themselves and live according to 
it,” and are not subjected to normative judgments which would make them 
“criminals” instead of “opponents” (1845, p. 158). Each must assert his or 
her “distinctness or peculiarity” against others: “you need not give way or 
renounce yourself ” (1845, p. 161). Abyssal thought is thus entirely rejected. 
In a sense, this is a dis-alienated recognition, a subject-subject relation, even 
the terminology echoes Buber and Levinas (Firth, 2012, p. 144). This I-you 
relation, however, is possible only between two subjects who reject spooks, 
which then creates conditions of possibility for the kinds of horizontal rela-
tionships that will later be discussed under the rubric of “consciousness-
raising.” This relation, however, is possible only between two subjects who 
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reject spooks and have reached the third level of consciousness (Stirner, 
1845, pp. 175, 207).
Stirner and Critical Pedagogy
Stirner’s (1845) ideas have much in common with contemporary theories 
of critical pedagogy. For example, consider the themes of embodiment (e.g., 
p. 21), anti-essentialism (p. 36), self-transformation (p. 39), a relational or 
pragmatic view of science (“what is science for but to be consumed?”) (p. 133), 
and the processual nature of knowledge and subjectivity (p. 249). However, 
Stirner (1845) goes further in rejecting moulding as a product of spook-rid-
den moral thought (p. 64). Education as moulding produces only “rigid” char-
acters, and not creative egoists (Stirner, 2009, p. 9), It trains people to dance 
to another’s tune, rather than to self-actualize and become (p. 248). It provides 
training suited to the state or spook, not the self (p. 173). Furthermore, even 
successful moulding never reaches the ideal, but simply professes it with the 
mouth (p. 253). Formal education singularly fails to produce egoists. “Such 
thoroughly true men are not supplied by school; if they are nevertheless 
there, they are there in spite of school” (2009, p. 8).
Hence, Stirner seeks some kind of pedagogy, but rejects the dominant 
structure of pedagogy as moulding. People are not already Stirnerian egoists. 
Maturation from the second to the third stage is desirable. For this, some 
kind of pedagogical process seems necessary. Modern-day Stirnerian Wolfi 
Landstreicher (2005), argues that
The anarchist recognition of the primacy of the actual, living indi-
vidual (as opposed to the collectivized cog and to the abstract concept 
of the individual) is the recognition that we need to become a certain 
sort of being, a being capable of acting on our own terms to realize our 
own desires and dreams in the face of the most fierce and powerful 
enemy: this entire civilization . . . the transformation of oneself into a 
spirited, willful being. (pp. 3–4).
In other words, he frames the Stirnerian process of reaching the third 
stage of an autonomous ego as inherently pedagogical. Yet existing peda-
gogical institutions are rejected as necessarily entangled with the second 
stage—the domain of spooks. We need ways to pass from the second (or first) 
stage to the third stage of self-realization of value, to come to see ourselves as 
unique, non-representable wills and not as particular attributes, spooks, or 
abstractions.
Deleuze and Pedagogy without Moulding
While Stirner theorizes a process of maturation through which an autono-
mous, disalienated “ego” emerges, Koch (1997) argues, “Stirner never devel-
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oped the language to go into greater depth on the construction, functioning, 
and consequences of the fixed idea” (p. 102). Part of this gap can be filled by 
cross-reading Stirner with Deleuze and Guattari, who theorize the transition 
from second to third stage. While Deleuze (1986) follows the conventional 
(and unhelpful) analysis of Stirner as a nihilist, he also recognizes him as the 
ultimate theorist of dis-alienation (pp. 159–161). Despite this apparent lack 
of direct influence, Stirner and Deleuze are united in their “rejection of the 
tyranny of ‘labels,’ essential identities, abstractions and ‘fixed ideas’ . . . [i.e.] 
authoritarian concepts which limit thought” (Newman, 2001, p. 4).
Deleuze and Guattari’s three stages of schizoanalysis offer a practical 
typology of the tasks of pedagogical transformation from a spook-ridden to 
a free subjectivity, thus providing an alternative to moulding approaches. 
Their approach is posited as a way of liberating energies so they can flow 
freely. In any territorial regime, including the neoliberal “society of control” 
(Deleuze, 1992), desire becomes caught-up in traps and knots, broadly analo-
gous to the Stirnerian account of wheels in the head, from which it needs to 
free itself. The process of remaining trapped within (for example) a micro-
family drama and its neurotic psychological expressions is a means by which 
desire is mapped onto rigid schemas and prevented from becoming. As in 
Stirner, so in Deleuze, this process is linked to fixed ideas such as the natu-
ralization of the family (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, pp. 365–368).
The first task of schizoanalysis or pedagogy is negative and consists of 
breaking down the traps, knots, or wheels in the head. Hence there is a task 
of destruction, a “scouring” or “curettage” of the unconscious to clear out 
Oedipus and its correlates (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 417). The purpose 
of this process is not to mould the student/analysand into a form already 
known to the teacher/therapist but rather to create the space for the 
emergence of flows beyond representation. This requires breaking down 
the underpinnings of ideas, which, in Stirner’s terms, possess or “own” us, 
including subjectivities arising from them, and it frees flows at a sub-indi-
vidual level (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 396). We would argue that the ego, 
which is deconstructed, is the psychoanalytic, not the Stirnerian ego, and it 
is largely coextensive with what Stirner terms geist (mind or spirit). Deleuze 
and Guattari’s “prepersonal singularities” are elements of a unique subject, 
which is not subordinate to spooks.
Deleuze and Guattari’s first stage loosely corresponds to overcoming 
the first and second stages of self-becoming in Stirner’s theory—the first 
stage, purely sensory and hedonistic, and the second stage, representa-
tional or spook-ridden. Both theorists begin from the disalienated level of 
the sensing, experiencing self in order to challenge the closure imposed 
by spooks. Beginning from identification with spooks and repressive social 
structures, one progresses to an identification of spooks, an ability to see 
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and to distance oneself from dominant social constructions which entails 
decolonization of one’s self-knowledge or sense of self. As Choi and Black 
(2008) argue, “we can be free from ideologies. We can be without them if we 
become aware of them” (p. 74).
Along with this negative function, there are two positive functions of 
analysis/education. The first is to discover the “desiring-machines” within 
a subject (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 354). This process of reconstruction 
forms chains of connections, thus performing a process of dis-alienation 
between the subject and his or her environment or milieu. The second posi-
tive function is to reinvest the flows socially, in revolutionary ways (p. 373). 
This involves reintroducing the “outside” and relating flows of desire to emo-
tional investments in the broader socio-political field; on an experiential 
level, this is termed a “body without organs”—a difficult concept to inter-
pret, being structurally similar to Buddhist, Gnostic, and New Age models of 
bodily/spiritual experience, beyond the identity as “self ” or “ego.” In many 
ways, this is similar to Stirner’s third-stage self. When Deleuze and Guattari 
(2004) argue that “the product of analysis should be a free and joyous person, 
a carrier of the life flows” (p. 364), they echo Stirner’s language of passion, 
creativity, and living to the limit. Even more crucially, the process varies with 
the desiring-machines of each student/analysand, which are always-already 
differentiated. The resulting subject is not moulded into a fixed image, but 
instead, he/she is radically unique. These stages involve self-valorization as 
an autonomous subject, structured through desire and becoming.
In previous sections, we argued for the possibility and indeed, necessity 
of a pedagogy without moulding, and we have outlined some of the theoreti-
cal conditions that might underpin such a pedagogy. But how might such 
pedagogy, without moulding, culminating in an autonomous, joyful subject 
of becoming, happen in practice? We feel it is useful to look to feminist con-
sciousness-raising (CR) from the 1970s as a non-exhaustive example of such a 
process. Like Stirnerian and Deleuzian pedagogies, CR is structured to break 
down submersion in a dominant regime of spooks, in particular, women’s 
submersion in and acceptance of patriarchy. While it is aimed mainly for the 
emergence of autonomous subjectivity on a collective rather than individual 
level, and it has a stronger emphasis than Stirner or Deleuze on structurally 
situating oneself (and thus differs somewhat from the Stirnerian/Deleuzian 
unique standpoint model), it is sufficiently similar to exemplify what a peda-
gogy without moulding might involve.
Consciousness-Raising
Consciousness-raising (CR) groups were a fundamental aspect of the second-
wave feminist movement, arising in the late 1960s and becoming popular 
during the 1970s. They have been interpreted as a pedagogical tool for social 
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transformation (Henderson-King & Stewart, 1999). CR groups were volun-
tary, usually women-only, regular discussion groups focused on recounting 
and interpreting the experiences of participants, generally by presenting 
members’ experiences around a defined topic and then drawing out similari-
ties and structural relations to the oppression of women. We would describe 
CR as a variant of pedagogy without moulding. It is pedagogical insofar as 
it seeks to transform existing consciousness so as to escape dominance by 
(patriarchal) spooks, and it is non-moulding in that there is no transcendent 
vision towards which participants are transformed. We argue that CR should 
be revived as a form of anarchist pedagogy, compatible with Deleuzian and 
Stirnerian approaches. Theorizing CR using Stirnerian-Deleuzian concepts 
offers the beginnings of a transferable model of pedagogy without mould-
ing. This is an exercise in transversal, horizontal, intellectual, translation 
between contexts, rather than a vanguardist claim to know the true method. 
We do not claim that CR is the only possible approach to pedagogy without 
moulding; practices such as militant inquiry, Theatre of the Oppressed, 
deschooling, and the more horizontalist varieties of Freirean approaches 
would be other possible lines of inquiry.
Identifying and Overcoming Spooks
It was suggested above that the first task of transformation is the nega-
tive task—decolonizing thought or unlearning spooks. In feminist CR, the 
main spooks, which acted as barriers to self-actualization, were those that 
tied women to patriarchy. CR was able to challenge these spooks through a 
practice of speaking from personal experiences among women, without the 
mediation of men or dominant institutions. By removing the main medi-
ating spooks, CR created a possibility of subject-subject communication. 
The process would “emphasize our own feelings and experiences as women” 
(Sarachild, 1975, p. 145), on the assumption that women’s “own true indi-
vidual awareness is somehow not really operative” within patriarchy, being 
“blocked or stymied or repressed or just overloaded with so much shit” (Forer, 
1975, p. 151). In addition to the testifying function, there is a function of vali-
dation: “that the pain is pain, that it is also one’s own, that women are real” 
(MacKinnon, 1989, p. 91). This process is taken to break down what Levine 
(1979) refers to as a “cop in the head” (a moralizing force within each person), 
analogous to Stirner’s wheels in the head (p. 7).
While CR did not simply leave existing narratives unchanged, it vali-
dated the reality of otherwise disavowed experiences of oppression, thus cre-
ating a standpoint from outside the dominant regime of spooks from which 
the unthinkable could be thought. In discovering that the “personal narra-
tive is political,” participants “transform the dominant meaning of experi-
ence by bringing a different set of assumptions to bear on it” (Langellier, 
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1989, p. 269). It changed the criteria of verification, from criteria focused on 
dominant spooks to criteria focused on one’s own experience (MacKinnon, 
1989, p. 87). By assessing experiences from their embodied and affective 
significance for oneself—rather than their meaning in the regime of spooks, 
or for dominant others (in this case, men)—the representational power of 
spooks to overwrite and judge desire is stripped away, and the wheels in the 
head are broken down, or at least suspended for long enough for other ways 
of seeing to become possible.
Forming Autonomous Desires
The autonomous standpoint associated with Deleuze’s second task, and with 
Stirner’s project of self-valorization, entails beginning from one’s own stand-
point—a disalienated level of sensing, experiencing, and living as an embod-
ied subject, as well as a standpoint of opposition to oppression. This is echoed 
in CR. A primary purpose of CR is to “develop ideology and learn to think 
autonomously” (Allen, 1970, p. 8). The process of forming an autonomous 
standpoint generally occurred through the “summing-up” process, which 
followed the accounts of experiences. This process constructed a distinctly 
feminist point of view in which everyday experiences are seen differently, as 
political, structurally situated experiences (Shreve, 1989, p. 45, 220; Bartky, 
1977, p. 26; Brownmiller, 1970, p. 146; Allen, 1970, p. 28). A process of structural 
derivation consists of relating formerly personalized problems such as indi-
vidual malaise, to sexism and other structural causes, so the problems appear 
as a political pattern rather than as diffuse bad luck or individual dysfunction 
(Shreve, 1989, p. 59; Dreifus, 1973, p. 5; Bruley, 1976, p. 21).
Prior to the process, participants’ lives are in turmoil, but few under-
stood why (Shreve, 1989, p. 40). The CR process provided particular ways 
to articulate experiences in new, feminist ways (Shreve, 1989, p. 30). The 
process moves from personal experience towards developing a more 
general view of social conditions broader than one’s own position (Shreve, 
1989, p. 198). This gives a “vantage point” perspective on daily life (Allen, 
1970, pp. 20–21), and bridges politics and one’s own life (Bruley, 1976, p. 21; 
c.f. Allen, 1970, p. 15), or objectifies consciousness at a given time (Forer, 
1975,p. 151). The construction of an autonomous voice, expressing authentic 
desires, is a difficult and time-consuming task as it requires recognizing 
and overcoming existing habits of superficial communication (Bruley, 1976, 
p. 8). This aspect of CR is based on the premise that women “had been glued 
to our men and separated from each other all our lives” (Arnold, 1970, p. 160). 
CR enables women to relate directly, instead of through men as a media-
tor (Bruley, 1976, p. 21), whilst problematizing and overcoming feelings of 
hatred for the self and other women imbued by patriarchal culture (Allen, 
1970, p. 11). In feminist terminology, the moment of attaining autonomy is 
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termed the “click” (Reger, 2004, p. 211; Allen, 1970, p. 27), a term for the “eye-
popping realization” of how patriarchy structures life experiences (Shreve, 
1989, p. 53).
From a Stirnerian-Deleuzian perspective, the reconstruction of affec-
tive autonomy is particularly important. In CR, this process was focused on 
the patriarchal repression of women’s anger. Bruley (1976, p. 13) suggests 
that consciousness-raising directly challenges the guilt one may feel about 
the suppression of anger. The group gives each participant “permission” to 
feel anger, allowing it to become an “energizing force for change, increasing 
confidence, and enhancing relationships” (Randolph & Ross-Valliere, 1979, 
p. 924), and to turn anger into “constructive energy” (Levine, 1979, p. 6). This 
process is not a kind of moulding through which emotions are repressed 
and forced into new paths. Rather, emotions are channeled expressively into 
a process of becoming and interacting creatively with the world. Anger is 
not channeled into resentful feelings of inferiority, but vented in a projectile, 
affirmative way. Crucially, emotions were expressed, not programmed in 
the groups (Brownmiller, 1970, p. 152). This parallels Stirner’s and Deleuze’s 
concerns with pedagogy as a process of becoming, rather than an attempt to 
mould participants’ subjectivity to some assumed notion of human nature 
or moral good. There is no knowing subject who tells participants what they 
are to become, but rather, there is a type of self-transformation.
Forming Connections
The third task discussed above is the social recreation of new existential 
territories from the autonomous standpoint. Levine (n.d.) draws the conclu-
sions of CR in this direction: the small group is not a precursor to large formal 
organizations but rather an alternative revolutionary approach to political 
organization and social life. The process of reconceptualizing experiences 
through a framework that acknowledges and opposes structural oppres-
sion creates a transformation in alignments, which sometimes (though not 
always) leads to politicization. Personal experiences and affects are rearticu-
lated into political connections by being taken as instances of larger, struc-
tural issues (Bond & Lieberman, 1980, p. 289). This creates a worldview, an 
ideology (Allen, 1970, p. 8) or a “theoretical horizon” (Malo, 2004), which 
rearranges social connections, conceptualizing “where we are in light of 
where we are not yet” (Bartky, 1977, p. 26).
The emergence of self-expression within the group can have wider 
social influence, insofar as women may choose to identify and reject roles 
that are repressive rather than expressive (Randolph & Ross-Valliere, 1979, 
p. 923). For example, an interviewee in Reger’s (2004) paper stated, “You 
know, even if it is as one woman said . . . something about nailing her hus-
band’s socks to the floor or something or not picking up his socks. Even if 
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it is a small act in your life . . . those things can build” (Reger, 2004, p. 216). 
Another interviewee refers to sexism in the workplace, suggesting that 
CR encouraged her to respond with anger, instead of becoming depressed 
(Shreve, 1989, p. 102). While some groups evolved into political affinity or 
mutual aid groups (Shreve 1989, p. 199; Allen, 1970, p. 19), or fed into activ-
ism in wider networks, “some [participants] were not interested in larger 
societal change, while others worked to maintain an alternative culture” 
(Reger, 2004, p. 218). However, we would argue that creating an alterna-
tive space and environment for the transformation of consciousness is a 
form of political change. Forming dis-alienated unions, independent of 
society is always-already a political act. As MacKinnon (1989) states, “By 
providing room for women to be close, these groups demonstrated how far 
women were separated” (p. 87). Reconnection occurs through a sense of 
closeness derived from intimate communication and similarities of experi-
ence (Dreifus, 1973, p. 52). Furthermore, participation in CR helped women 
to relate within wider politics as it taught women a different way of relat-
ing than the dominant style within patriarchal and capitalist structures, 
which often encourage controlling, manipulative, and competitive com-
munication styles (Arnold, 1970, p. 161). CR provided a new model based on 
co-operation, non-hierarchy and sharing, which could then be carried out 
into wider environments (Randolph & Ross-Valliere, 1979, p. 924). From 
a Stirnerian perspective, the crucial political change is the actualization 
of an autonomous standpoint. What is most important is that this emer-
gent being is true to its own becoming, not that this becoming takes one or 
another form.
Given the continuing interest in subaltern standpoints and epistemolo-
gies, we would argue that processes of this kind are vitally necessary and 
need to be revived. Today there are many attempts (by poststructuralists, 
feminists, autonomists, decolonial scholars, etc.) to elaborate perspectives 
based on standpoints of marginalized groups or individuals. Yet there is a 
significant problem with perspectives reconstructed by academics, often 
based on their own experiences and/or established theories, but which are 
not coextensive with existing narratives of those for whom they claim to 
speak (Reynolds, 2002). This creates a dilemma in which one must either 
accept the (often conservative or conformist) everyday narratives of the 
oppressed, folding reality onto neoliberalism, or else one must champion 
intellectual versions of liberationist politics which have lost their grassroots 
derivation, either adopting a vanguard stance or simply speaking from one’s 
own (typically privileged) standpoint. Processes such as CR, by creating a 
standpoint-based perspective, which did not pre-exist them and which is not 
simply imported by educators, provide a basis for an emancipatory politics 
which does not succumb to these positions.
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Conclusion
This chapter began with the question of whether a pedagogy without mould-
ing—a pedagogy compatible with horizontal relations and the rejection of 
command—is possible. It has woven an account, from Stirner, Deleuze, and 
feminist consciousness-raising, which suggests that such a pedagogy is 
possible as well as necessary. From a Stirnerian position, the pedagogical 
process of emergence as a unique “ego,” a standpoint of desire in a constant 
process of becoming and living, is incompatible with pedagogies of moulding. 
Yet dominant models of education, and even those prevalent in critical peda-
gogy, retain moulding as a basic assumption. We suggested that Deleuze’s 
three stages of schizoanalysis provide a structural matrix for a pedagogy 
without moulding, and further demonstrated that this structural matrix was 
actualized in the historical practice of consciousness-raising in the feminist 
movement. We suggest that this provides a way forward for the development 
of pedagogies without moulding.
We would suggest, therefore, that there is promise in developing con-
sciousness-raising as a specifically anarchist pedagogy. While feminist CR 
focused mainly on gender oppression—and CR focused on structural oppres-
sions (still a valuable project today)—it would also be possible to develop 
forms of CR which focus on the self-destroying impact of spooks and the 
hierarchies they generate. In this way, the “click” is arrival at a Stirnerian 
unique standpoint, and the structural matrix one comes to see is expanded 
from a particular type of structural oppression to the entire field of aliena-
tion and possession by spooks. Of course, this leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of how to create such groups in a society of control, in which the act of 
coming together regularly without mediation is itself a difficult struggle 
(Bey, 1994, pp. 20–22). We believe, however, that we have established that 
a pedagogy without moulding is both possible and desirable. The remaining 
question is how to realize it.
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